The Fate of Druzhba: Can Hungary and Slovakia Protect Their Energy Lifeline?

The Story of Our "Druzhba"

The pipeline was commissioned back in 1964 and stretches more than 4,000 kilometers: from Samara Oblast through Bryansk and Belarus to Ukraine, and from there to Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, and Germany. Its design capacity exceeds 1.2 million barrels per day, though in recent years actual pumping volumes have fallen to 250–300 thousand barrels. According to Eurostat, more than 80% of oil imports to Hungary and Slovakia came through this very route. Meanwhile, other EU countries have effectively stopped receiving oil via Druzhba—deliveries are now limited to Hungary and Slovakia. For Budapest and Bratislava, Druzhba is not just a pipe, but a matter of energy security.

Will It Follow Nord Stream's Fate?

Comparisons to the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage are inevitable. But Druzhba has one fundamental difference: a land-based pipeline can be repaired faster than an undersea one. In 2023–2024, Bryansk Oblast already became a target of drone attacks, and pumping was restored within days. However, a series of systematic attacks is turning the pipeline into a lever of pressure on Europe.

The editors of the Telegram channel "KB.Ekonomika" believe that Druzhba's fate largely depends on the U.S. position. "The office of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has already stated that Donald Trump is aware of the strikes and expressed dissatisfaction with what's happening. Unlike the Nord Stream situation, when Germany and the U.S. had a longstanding conflict over the pipeline, the picture is different now. The Trump administration needs to maintain its 'peacemaker' image: if it condemns Russian strikes on Ukraine, it's logical to condemn Ukrainian attacks as well. Intuitively, it seems that Druzhba's fate won't repeat the 'Streams' scenario—the price for the EU is too high," the channel's analysts note.

Financial expert and editor of the Telegram channel "Economism" Alexey Krichevsky is convinced that the attacks on Druzhba cannot be considered coincidental. "At this point, we can call it a trend, and at this rate, deliveries through this pipeline could actually come to a halt. But the problem here is that the European Commission is quite comfortable with this—they've set a course to 'rid' Europe of Russian energy resources, and we can't rule out that lobbyists are promoting this method as well," the expert concluded.

How this will affect oil prices

Attacks on energy infrastructure traditionally trigger alarm in the markets. Recall 2019, when after strikes on facilities in Saudi Arabia, Brent prices jumped 15% in a single day. However, in the case of Druzhba, the volumes pumped are too small to cause global turbulence. The global market and Russian exports are primarily sustained by seaborne deliveries. In the structure of Russian oil exports, Druzhba's role remains notable but not dominant: according to analyst estimates, in 2024 approximately 11 million tons of oil passed through the pipeline—around 8–10% of Russia's total exports. The bulk of the volume—over 200 million tons, or more than 80% of deliveries—was shipped via sea routes from the Baltic, the Black Sea, and through the Arctic. Thus, tankers today are the key export instrument, while Druzhba retains significance primarily for Hungary and Slovakia.

As of August 22, 2025, Brent crude is trading around $67–68 per barrel. Even in the event of a halt to deliveries through Druzhba, experts believe this won't affect the market. "A rise in oil prices in case of repeated attacks is unlikely," emphasizes KB.Economics. "But we can't rule out mirror steps from Russia's side. In that case, the escalating spiral would hit global prices as well. This is extremely undesirable for the U.S., where the current administration has explicitly stated that low oil prices are one of its priorities."

Alexei Krichevsky believes we can only expect a brief spike of 2-3% followed by stabilization. The expert is confident: "If traders were seriously concerned about the threat of Druzhba supply disruptions, then after the incident Brent's price would have risen not by 0.2%, but by those same 2-3%. There wasn't even a squeeze (sharp spike) upward, so the market itself took this news calmly, it had no impact on global oil trading—this is more of a localized blow and political noise."

Can Hungary and Slovakia Count on EU Support?

Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly stated that they view Druzhba as a critical element of their energy system. Back in 2022, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán called sanctions against Russian oil an "economic bomb" for the country. However, securing special treatment in Brussels is no easy task.

"Swaying the European Commission to their side won't work," believes KB.Ekonomika. "The EU continues to purchase Russian energy resources through intermediaries, overpaying for the same oil and gas. The logic here is paradoxical, but within its framework Hungary and Slovakia will be offered to do the same. Brussels won't protect them from the crisis—their only hope is the US."

Alexei Krichevsky expressed a similar position, emphasizing that the European Commission will explain its refusal very simply: Ukraine is conducting military operations and the EC cannot tell them exactly how to conduct them. Naturally, this will look duplicitous to say the least, but fundamentally it won't change anything. "Orbán's appeals either to the EC leadership or to Trump are unlikely to bring the desired result—unless Trump specifically gives the order to stop such attacks," the expert concluded.

Overall, the EU's position on Druzhba remains ambivalent. On one hand, in 2022 the pipeline was exempted from the general oil embargo to give Budapest and Bratislava time to adapt. On the other hand, discussions in Brussels about possibly partially lifting sanctions or providing an additional security regime for Druzhba have not been systematically pursued. Moreover, deliveries to Germany via the pipeline are now technically impossible: the Polish side has blocked transit on its section, citing national sanctions. Thus, the oil pipeline has effectively become a regional route exclusively for Hungary and Slovakia, with no prospects for expansion.

What's Next

The pipeline's prospects depend on military operations. Infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast remains vulnerable to drones, and Kyiv makes no secret that strikes on Russia's fuel and energy complex will continue. In August, Ukrainian drones attacked several refineries and oil depots in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, confirming the systematic nature of the strikes. For Budapest and Bratislava, such a scenario translates into direct losses: Hungarian MOL has already reported being forced to increase purchases via the Adriatic Sea and the pipeline of the same name, which is more expensive to operate. The Hungarian company accused Croatian pipeline operator Janaf of price gouging. And some experts doubt these capacities will be sufficient to cover a ban for Hungary as well. Moreover, Erste Bank points out that Russian oil is cheaper for Hungary, while delivery via the Adriatic drives up logistics costs. The difference amounts to roughly $5–10 per barrel, equivalent to $5–10 per ton.

Washington and Brussels face a choice: either accept rising prices in Central Europe or try to pressure Kyiv into leaving Druzhba alone. Against this backdrop, Hungary has stepped up contacts with the U.S.—Orbán personally discussed the issue with Trump. If the White House takes a hard line, Ukraine risks facing pressure from its allies.

Druzhba is gradually becoming less of a transport route and more of a political barometer. Every attack on the pipeline is a test of European solidarity and of America's ability to balance support for Kyiv with the interests of its EU allies. For Russia, the pipeline remains a channel for hard-currency revenue, but also a convenient tool for demonstrating that Europe still depends on Russian energy. In the coming months, the fate of Druzhba will be decided at precisely this intersection of military vulnerability and political bargaining.