We examine with experts what functions the fiscal rule served, what has now been temporarily suspended, and what consequences this holds for Russia's economy.
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In early 2026, the Ministry of Finance announced a temporary suspension of certain mechanisms of the fiscal rule until July 1. This primarily concerns currency operations—the purchase and sale of yuan and other currencies as part of smoothing oil and gas revenues. The decision appears technical, but in reality it affects several key elements of the economy at once: the ruble exchange rate, budget sustainability, and inflation.
According to the Ministry of Finance, oil and gas revenues in 2025 totaled approximately 8.4 trillion rubles versus 11.1 trillion rubles in 2024. Meanwhile, the overall budget deficit in 2025 was around 5.6 trillion rubles (approximately 2.6% of GDP), whereas in 2024 it was higher—about 3.4 trillion rubles. The dependence on commodities hasn't gone anywhere.
Functions of the fiscal rule and what exactly has been suspended
The fiscal rule has long been a key instrument of macroeconomic stability. Its essence lies in cutting off "excess" oil and gas revenues and directing them into reserves. Artem Maksadov, analyst, author of the Telegram channel , puts it this way:
"The fiscal rule performed two functions. First, it reduced the federal budget's dependence on oil and gas revenues: when oil prices were high, surplus revenues were sent to the National Wealth Fund, and when they were low and revenues fell short, they were compensated from the National Wealth Fund. Second, it stabilized the ruble exchange rate—when oil prices were low, the Ministry of Finance supported the ruble by selling currency, and when they were high, it bought currency to prevent excessive ruble appreciation. Now operations related to buying and selling the ruble have been temporarily suspended."
Thus, we're not talking about abolishing the rule entirely. What has been suspended is specifically the currency component—that is, the mechanism that directly influenced the ruble exchange rate through the market. Lyudmila Rakhimova, author and host of the podcast "Rakhimova on Economics," takes a considerably more critical view of the budget rule's role. In her opinion, in theory this mechanism was supposed to smooth out economic cycles, preventing overheating from excess oil and gas revenues, support the ruble exchange rate, and build up reserves in the NWF. In practice, however, she believes that Russia's exchange rate is already managed manually and depends on more than just the budget rule, while the National Wealth Fund itself no longer fully performs its former stabilization function, which intensifies the sense of economic cooling.
Delayed Effects: What Will Manifest Later
At first glance, the pause is short—just a few months. But even such decisions can have delayed consequences. According to Maksadov, the effect of suspending the budget rule will be limited, since the pause until July 1 is too short to lead to significant systemic consequences. At the same time, he allows that locally, the cancellation of currency operations under the rule is already putting pressure on the ruble exchange rate and may contribute to its weakening.
And indeed, in early 2026 the ruble was already showing volatility. According to analysts, the exchange rate fluctuated in the range of 79–84 rubles per dollar, whereas the average rate for 2025 was around 83.4 rubles.
Rakhimova looks further ahead:
"The ruble exchange rate will gradually reach 90 rubles per dollar, and then no one will really care much about what's happening with this ruble."
In economic terms, this means a gradual weakening of the factors supporting exchange rate stability.
How the Finance Ministry's Work Will Change
One of the key questions is whether budget management will become more "manual." Artem Maksadov doesn't see radical changes:
"I think the work won't change at all and won't shift to manual decision-making. For now we see that only the part related to buying and selling currency has been canceled; perhaps these operations will simply be shifted to a later date."
However, in fact even a temporary suspension of automaticity means an increased role for situational decisions. Previously, when oil prices rose, the Finance Ministry automatically bought currency; now it doesn't. This creates space for subjective decisions.
Rakhimova describes the situation quite emotionally, but essentially points to the same trends: in her opinion, the Finance Ministry's work has already changed, and the temporary suspension of the budget rule may support the budget through a weaker ruble, which benefits the state, though it brings no benefit to the population.
A weak ruble does indeed boost the budget's ruble-denominated revenues from exports. In 2025, the average price of Urals crude was around $63 per barrel, but in ruble terms it depended heavily on the exchange rate.
Long-term risks to the ruble exchange rate
The main long-term risk is increased volatility. Previously, the budget rule smoothed out fluctuations: when oil prices rose, the ruble didn't strengthen too much; when they fell, it didn't weaken sharply. Now this buffer has temporarily disappeared.
Maksadov emphasizes that the situation shouldn't be dramatized, since in his view this isn't about the government completely abandoning the smoothing of oil revenues—rather, the cutoff price level will be revised. Rakhimova, for her part, considers a harsher scenario, pointing to risks of accelerating inflation, though she notes that the suspension of the budget rule itself is temporary in nature.
In practice, the truth lies somewhere in between. According to Rosstat, inflation in 2025 was around 5.5%, compared to 9.5% in 2024. A weaker ruble could accelerate inflation again through imports.
The logic of budget spending: where's the risk of overspending
Without a strict link to the cutoff price, there's a risk of more liberal spending. Previously, excess revenues automatically went into the National Wealth Fund. Now some of these funds may remain in the economy.
Artem Maksadov clarifies:
"The budget rule hasn't been abolished, it continues to operate... currency operations won't be conducted until July 1."
But even a temporary "relaxation of discipline" can influence decisions. Rakhimova frames the problem starkly:
"In January-February 2026, we've found ourselves in a situation where we urgently need to throw more wood into the furnace of the economy."
This reflects a real dilemma: on one hand, the need to stimulate the economy; on the other, the risk of ballooning the deficit.
Long-term stability: Will the budget become less predictable?
The key question isn't the pause itself, but the signal it sends. Maksadov draws attention to an existing structural problem, pointing out that over the past two years, the Finance Ministry's expectations have been based on an unrealistically high dollar exchange rate and high oil prices, which led to a wider budget deficit. He also concludes that lowering the cutoff price in the budget rule should contribute to greater budget predictability. Rakhimova, by contrast, expresses doubt about the very possibility of such predictability, posing a rhetorical question about whether the budget over the past two years has been truly predictable at all. What we're really talking about is a shift in models: from formal rules to flexible management.
The state is temporarily abandoning automatic mechanisms in favor of flexibility. This provides short-term advantages, primarily for the budget through a weaker ruble. But it simultaneously increases risks: exchange rate volatility, inflationary pressure, and reduced predictability of fiscal policy.
The key point isn't the pause until July itself, but whether it becomes a precedent. If it does, the economy will definitively shift from rules-based management to "manual" control. And that's an entirely different frame of reference.
