After Zolotaya Korona: What Money Transfer Options to CIS Countries Do Russians Have Left

Sanctions Reach Everyday Payments

The new 21st EU sanctions package, announced on July 23, 2026, became one of the largest in recent years. Beyond restrictions on energy, trade, and the banking sector, for the first time the measures targeted the infrastructure through which millions of people sent money abroad daily. The European Union banned transactions with 32 Russian banks and imposed restrictions against RNKO "Payment Center"—the settlement center of the "Zolotaya Korona" payment system.

Why Zolotaya Korona Specifically

After Visa and Mastercard withdrew from Russia, Zolotaya Korona became one of the key channels for cross-border transfers. The service allowed users to send money without opening a bank account, receive it in cash or have it credited to a card, and its network included more than 550 banks and partners in Russia, CIS countries, and beyond.

The main users were migrant workers, Russian citizens living abroad, families regularly supporting relatives, and small business representatives who needed quick settlements with foreign counterparties.

However, by mid-2026, the system proved vulnerable due to its dependence on international banking infrastructure. The sanctions were imposed not against the brand itself, but against RNKO "Payment Center"—the operator and settlement center of the payment system. After this, foreign banks began refusing cooperation, fearing secondary sanctions. By July 24, transfers from Russia were only available to four countries—Uzbekistan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, while operations to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and several other states became unavailable.

The situation is compounded by the service's current operating regime. According to official terms, from December 8, 2025, through December 7, 2026, Russian banks are not authorized to conduct cross-border transfers under this product. The new sanctions didn't create the problem from scratch but merely intensified already existing restrictions. As a result, Zolotaya Korona is gradually transforming from a mass channel for international transfers into a service with limited geography and less predictable operation.

Why the Restrictions Affect Central Asian Countries

The restrictions affected not only users of the service but also countries whose economies largely depend on remittances.

This dependence is especially noticeable in Uzbekistan. Throughout 2025, the total volume of cross-border remittances to Uzbekistan reached $18.9 billion, increasing 28% compared to 2024. The Russian Federation accounted for approximately $14.5–14.7 billion (roughly 77–78%). 

The Russian market plays a significant role for Tajikistan as well. Remittance flows to Tajikistan remain at around $5.8 billion, accounting for approximately 45–46% of the country's GDP, making the republic's economy one of the most transfer-dependent in the world. In Kyrgyzstan, remittances in 2025 totaled $3.49 billion. For these countries, money sent home by citizens working abroad remains a vital source of household income, consumer spending support, and domestic market stability.

That's why problems with international payment services extend far beyond individual user inconvenience. When transfers are delayed, become more expensive, or get rejected by intermediary banks, families receive their money later, and countries dependent on these inflows face additional pressure on consumer demand and currency markets.

Alternatives exist, but there's no full replacement

Formally, users still have several channels for international transfers: SWIFT bank operations, national payment systems, postal services, and cryptocurrency instruments. But in practice, these aren't equivalent substitutes: SWIFT is merely a system for transmitting interbank messages, not the actual money transfer itself, so the operation depends on the sending bank, correspondent banks, and receiving bank.

The contrast is especially striking against the domestic market backdrop: in Q1 2026, Russia's Faster Payment System processed 3.2 billion transfers worth 23.3 trillion rubles—meaning the mass infrastructure domestically already operates at a different scale. Cross-border payments are more complicated: even when some Russian banks have SWIFT access, actual transfer success rates are limited by the chain of intermediaries, sanctions compliance, and correspondent bank checks.

In practice, a SWIFT transfer from Russia often requires a complete set of details—IBAN, SWIFT/BIC, bank address, payment purpose—and passes through several links, each of which can add delays or reject the transaction. In 2026, market estimates for retail customers show commissions typically at 1–3%, but factoring in correspondent banks, conversion, and additional fees, the total cost can reach 5–15%.

The Financial Message Transfer System (SPFS) remains an important Russian system for exchanging financial messages, but its scale is incomparable to SWIFT: according to public reports, about 20 countries are connected to it, indicating international links but not a full-fledged global alternative. So for actual remittance corridors—especially to Central Asia—the decisive factor remains not the presence of a "technical channel," but the willingness of foreign banks and payment intermediaries to accept and process the message.

The market will continue to restructure

Sanctions against payment infrastructure are unlikely to eliminate international transfers altogether. Experience from recent years shows that financial markets can adapt to new restrictions, but each new wave of sanctions makes settlements more complex, expensive, and less predictable.

In the coming years, we can expect further development of direct banking corridors with friendly countries, expansion of settlements in national currencies, and the emergence of new international transfer operators. At the same time, proprietary payment infrastructures will play an increasingly important role, as dependence on foreign intermediaries becomes ever more risky.