22% VAT on Foreign Parcels: Quiet Protectionism Against China

Abruptly or Gradually—Either Way, the Customer Pays

The Ministry of Industry and Trade has backed the introduction of a full 22% rate on foreign online orders starting immediately in 2027. The Ministry of Finance proposes a phased schedule—5% in 2027, 10% in 2028, 15% in 2029, and 20% from 2030 onward. For marketplace sellers and foreign partners in Russian e-commerce, the difference is critical: will they have time to restructure their logistics? For the customer, there is no difference: by 2030, the figure on the receipt will be the same either way. All of this comes on top of the already implemented increase in the base VAT rate from 20% to 22% as of January 1, 2026—the tax burden first equalized domestically, and now extends to cross-border transactions.

The push for accelerated implementation came from Russian manufacturers and retail chains. The Russian Union of Leather and Footwear Manufacturers asked Mikhail Mishustin to introduce the 22% rate all at once starting in 2027. The main argument: footwear production in Russia fell 11% in January–February 2026. However, this is less a consequence of imports than a symptom of another problem: the Central Bank's key rate remains at 14.5%, consumer lending has contracted, and demand has shifted to the budget segment—and the budget segment is largely Chinese.

Recycling Fee as a Dress Rehearsal

The automotive market has already seen this playbook in action. The sharp increase in recycling fee rates as of December 1, 2025, was officially presented as support for localization: the word "China" wasn't mentioned in the rationale at all. Meanwhile, it was precisely Chinese models that accounted for the bulk of imports to individuals by late 2024—and they took the hardest hit. According to Autostat, in January–October 2025, imports of new passenger cars to Russia fell by 64%, and trucks by more than 90%. The paradox is that during the same period, Chinese automakers globally increased sales by 9%, while sales of new Chinese-assembled cars in Russia dropped 40%. The same scenario is being set up for marketplaces: only instead of passenger cars, the targets now are sneakers for 1,500 rubles and earbuds for 800.

Europe Did the Same Thing—Just More Loudly

In November 2025, the EU Council agreed to eliminate the €150 duty-free threshold two years ahead of schedule. The platforms targeted by these measures were named explicitly: Chinese retailers Temu, Shein, and AliExpress. In 2024, the EU received 4.6 billion parcels valued under €150 (roughly 12 million per day), with 90% of them coming from China.

The Russian version differs in one respect: rhetoric. While EU discussions centered on specific Chinese platforms, in Russia the focus is on "unfairness to Russian manufacturers." The word "China" barely appears in official justifications and public statements for obvious political reasons: Moscow and Beijing emphasize their strategic partnership. Yet economics doesn't depend on rhetoric. With China accounting for 90% of all foreign online orders in Russia, any tightening of cross-border regulations by definition hits Chinese imports first and foremost. The measure itself isn't necessarily bad: a country has every right to protect domestic production—all major economies use this tool today. The only question is who foots the bill.

Price tag for consumers: 22% and up

The final price of foreign online purchases faces three simultaneous hits: starting July 1, 2026, the EAEU will replace the current 15% duty on purchases over €200 with a 5% fee plus VAT, while from May 2026 marketplace commissions will be equalized (the gap for Chinese sellers reached 10–20%) along with a 22% VAT—under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's version, effective immediately from January 1, 2027. In the strictest scenario, a gadget priced at 5,000 rubles on AliExpress would rise to 6,100 rubles by 2027 from VAT alone.

For categories with high Chinese import shares, a realistic price increase range is 22–30%. This immediately affects electronics, clothing, home goods, and footwear. However, the impact on overall inflation will be limited, since cross-border trade accounts for just 3.8% of the e-commerce market. Yet at the household level, the arithmetic may look different and depends on purchasing activity, with urban residents more likely to use cross-border channels for their purchases. In 2025, Russians placed 209 million cross-border orders, and for tens of millions of buyers, this wasn't a way to save money on luxuries but a way to maintain their previous consumption levels on shrinking budgets.

Industrial protection will come at a cost

The logic of all participants in this story is rational in its own way. Russian manufacturers and retail chains are protecting their business from foreign competition—that's their direct commercial interest. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is responding to their request—that's its direct departmental function. And this isn't just about footwear and AKORT anymore: the VAT framework now includes leveling marketplace commissions, mandatory labeling, and the platform economy law. Overall, what we're actually seeing is a consistent protectionist policy, and Russia isn't acting uniquely here—it's doing exactly what all major economies do.

Besides Europe, the U.S. also in August 2025 eliminated the de minimis customs duty principle for Chinese imports. The logic is the same everywhere—protect your market from cheap Chinese goods. And the target is the same too. The Russian version stands out in its format and economic specifics: trade turnover between Russia and China in 2025 reached $228.1 billion, with China accounting for more than a third of all Russian foreign trade. Moscow and Beijing have a special strategic partnership that's quite unequal in trade terms, since the latter supplies goods rather than raw materials. That's why openly naming China as a threat to Russian industry is politically impossible. And the VAT, which will hit Chinese parcels 90% of the time, is justified in the rationale as "leveling the playing field."

Protecting the domestic market is a normal and universally accepted function of the state. But this protection has one unchanging constant in all countries: it's not paid for by the state, not by the budget, not by industry, but by the consumer.