Can China Overtake Russia in the Race for Nuclear Leadership?

The Evolution of China's Nuclear Industry

On March 23, 2026, Russia and Vietnam signed an intergovernmental agreement to build the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant. After lengthy and difficult deliberations, the country's leadership ultimately decided to partner with Russia's state corporation Rosatom. Among the potential contractors under consideration was China's China Power Engineering Consulting Company, which submitted its proposal twice.

Despite Western companies and Russia's Rosatom historically being considered the key players in nuclear energy, China has every chance of establishing its leadership in this sector in the future.

The path to building China's nuclear industry was challenging. The starting point can be traced to 1955, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted a decision to develop nuclear energy in the country. The Soviet Union provided significant assistance at the time, sending not only technology but also approximately ten thousand of its own specialists to China.

After the breakdown in relations, China remained in technological isolation for a considerable period (from 1960 to 1978) and was forced to rely on its own developments. Nevertheless, it was during this period that the atomic and hydrogen bombs were created, as well as a nuclear submarine.

With the launch of reform and opening-up policies in 1978, China began gradually converting military nuclear technologies to civilian use. Moreover, active implementation of joint projects with foreign companies began. It was then that close cooperation with France enabled improvements to China's own technological solutions in nuclear energy.

Finally, from the 2010s to the present, we can observe the emergence of so-called national "champions"—Chinese corporations including China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Group, which not only fully supply the domestic market but are also entering the global stage with their own technologies.

It's important to note that China's five-year plans for socioeconomic development played an equally significant role in developing the nuclear industry, largely contributing to the sector's institutionalization and support at the highest level (Table 1).

Nuclear Industry Growth and Technological Independence

As a result of long and painstaking work to develop nuclear energy, as of mid-2025 we see the following picture. Nearly half of all nuclear power units under construction worldwide are in China (Fig. 1). In terms of installed capacity of nuclear plants under construction, China similarly ranks first with 29 GW, far ahead of India (6 GW), Turkey (4 GW), Egypt (4 GW), and other countries.

Naturally, such scale requires enormous financial resources. And the Chinese state is ready to provide them. Investment in nuclear plant construction in China shows steady growth. In 2019 it stood at 33.5 billion yuan, and by 2024 this figure reached 146.9 billion yuan, increasing more than fourfold (Fig. 2). This trend speaks to the seriousness of Chinese leadership's intentions regarding the development of its own nuclear industry.

Starting with the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), the Chinese state has paid special attention to import substitution policy, which has been implemented quite effectively. In just over 20 years (from 1993 to 2016), China was able to move almost completely away from foreign suppliers of equipment and components to its own technological solutions—the localization level grew from 3% to over 75% (Fig. 3). In 2023, the share of domestic (i.e., Chinese) reactors by installed capacity in nuclear plants under construction was 78.6%, and by August 2025 the figure had already reached 85%. During this period, the share of Russian VVER-1200 reactors in the Chinese domestic market declined, but only slightly—from 16.8% to 14.7%. According to China General Nuclear Power Group, as of early 2026, the localization level of equipment for new power units with Hualong-1 reactors exceeded 95%. Thus, China currently provides itself almost entirely with key components for nuclear plant construction.

However, full autonomy has not yet been achieved. China faces two serious challenges that constrain the industry's development. The first is raw material dependence in the form of uranium ore. Reserves of this resource, essential for any nuclear power plant's operation, are quite limited within China's territory. The top three uranium producers are Kazakhstan (39% of global production as of 2024), Canada (24%), and Namibia (12%). Due to geographic proximity and resource needs, China is actively expanding its energy presence in Kazakhstan—in 2024–2025, a large-scale redistribution of Kazakh uranium assets occurred in China's favor. As a result, China is now involved in roughly a quarter of Kazakhstan's uranium mining capacity. Moreover, China holds a minority stake (49%) in Ulba-TVS, a plant in Kazakhstan that produces fuel pellets for nuclear power plants.

The second challenge is nuclear fuel. For Russian VVER reactors operating in China at the Xudapu and Tianwan nuclear power plants, fuel is supplied by TVEL Fuel Company, a subsidiary of Rosatom State Corporation. Part of this fuel is produced under license at a plant in Yibin (Sichuan Province). Incidentally, this is the first case of Russian fuel assemblies being manufactured outside Russia. At the same time, for mass-produced Chinese reactors, the country has its own production base. In early 2023, new centrifuge plants were commissioned, allowing China to increase its domestic uranium enrichment capacity.

China's Export Ambitions and Competition with Russia

In 2015, China developed what is now its key export technology—the third-generation Hualong One nuclear reactor (HRP-1000), which competes with Russia's VVER-1200. China began realizing its export potential back in 1993, with a contract to supply the first power units to Pakistan. It's worth noting that to this day, Pakistan remains the only country to which China has exported its nuclear technologies (specifically, the Chashma and Karachi nuclear power plants). Nevertheless, Beijing is actively working to promote its reactors in dozens of countries: from the UAE and Uzbekistan to Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria.

Unlike China, Russia—represented by Rosatom State Corporation—maintains both technological and export leadership in the global nuclear market. Russia accounts for approximately 88% of global nuclear power plant exports and has a presence in 62 countries. The choice of Russia as the main contractor is explained by extensive experience in NPP export and operation, technologies (particularly having a complete nuclear fuel cycle), and more attractive financial terms (such as interest rates, government loan coverage, grace periods, and overall loan duration). However, in terms of technology, China is actively catching up with Russia. According to the Generation IV International Forum, China's HTR-PM small modular reactor, commissioned in 2023, is considered a 4th generation technology that is currently being actively developed in Russia (the closest existing technology would be the BN-800 reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant). In the area of floating nuclear power plants, China is keeping pace: the ACPR50S and ACP100S projects are being actively developed. Russia, meanwhile, has the operational Akademik Lomonosov station.

Before our eyes, China is quite successfully implementing a two-stage strategy, the first stage of which consists of creating and subsequently developing a sustainable and technologically independent nuclear industry. And here China has achieved impressive results. The country is now consistently moving to the second stage, which involves scaling up the industry by exporting its nuclear technology solutions. Despite modest experience (only exports to Pakistan), China is actively attempting to enter new markets, sending out corresponding commercial proposals. At present, leadership belongs to Russia, but China is ready to challenge this position and possesses a number of capabilities to take its place in the long term.