аргумент.

This text is an automatic translation from Русский. It was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.

Read original →
Analysis

Producer Subsidies Cost 14–22 Times More Than Targeted Assistance

We examine why price spikes for basic goods hit the poorest families hardest, what different inflation-control measures cost governments, and why some subsidy funds intended for producers end up going to foreign buyers.

8 min read
Share:
Producer Subsidies Cost 14–22 Times More Than Targeted Assistance

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has published methodological appendices to the second chapter of its October World Economic Outlook—on cost-of-living crises. They show that spikes in food, housing, and transportation prices hit real wages with a lag of roughly one year, strike hardest at poor households, and that the most popular government response—price controls—turns out to be the most expensive.

Wages don't fall immediately, but a year later

The IMF defines a cost-of-living crisis narrowly: food, housing with utilities, and transportation become abnormally expensive, while other prices and wages fail to keep pace. The threshold is calculated separately for each country, at two standard deviations from its own norm. This means countries with chronically high inflation don't make it into the sample.

Different parts of the study use different samples. The IMF searched for episodes themselves across 85 countries with quarterly data on both prices and wages for 2005–2025. Welfare losses are calculated only for 18 European countries, while the subsidy model is calibrated on three representative economies: advanced economies are represented by France, Germany, and Italy; emerging markets by Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and South Africa; and low-income countries by Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

Russia is on the list. It's included in the overall sample for crisis analysis and in the database of support measures, but didn't make it into either the European welfare calculations or the model. The specifics are that Russia is a net energy exporter. The IMF separately compares energy importers and exporters, but doesn't disclose results for exporters in the appendices. For an exporter, expensive oil simultaneously drives up domestic prices and fills the budget—meaning money for support appears alongside the shock itself.

The mechanics are clearest in oil price increases. If crude prices jump 150%, the relative cost of basic goods rises 9% over two quarters, and 13% by the end of the second year. Real wages react with a delay: the trough—a 9.5% drop from pre-crisis levels—comes in quarters seven and eight, and even after three years they remain 4.5% below pre-crisis levels.

1
Relative prices of basic goods (blue line), real wages (red) and inflation gap between the poorest and richest 20% of families (yellow, right scale) by quarters from the beginning of the episode. Panels: 1 — crisis due to global commodity prices, 2 — oil supply shock, 3 — easing of eurozone monetary policy. Cumulative change, %. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2026.

The Fund compared three scenarios, all counting from the quarter before the episode. It tracks three parameters: prices of basic goods relative to the rest of the basket, real wages, and the gap in personal inflation between the poorest and richest households.

The first panel shows crises identified by global commodity prices. Basic goods become more expensive gradually, rising 10% by the tenth quarter, real wages hold steady for the first year then drop 4%. The inflation gap between poor and rich reaches 2.5 percentage points by the same point.

In the second panel, the oil shock, the same scissors open faster and wider: prices jump within two quarters, wages slide downward for two years. The third panel, using the example of ECB policy easing, looks almost like a mirror image: real wages grow by the end of the horizon, while the gap between poor and rich turns negative.

As a control, the Fund ran the same model on demand-driven inflation, using an unexpected 25 basis point easing by the European Central Bank (ECB). There's neither a significant drop in real wages nor an inflation gap between poor and rich. Hence the conclusion: cost-of-living crises are driven primarily by global supply shocks, not overheated demand.

The poorest spend twice as large a share of their budget on food

The shock hits unevenly because poor and rich have different baskets. In emerging economies, the poorest 20% of households spend about half their entire income on food, the richest about a quarter. In advanced countries, the gap runs through housing and utilities: for the bottom quintile it's over 40% of spending, for the top around a quarter.

Transportation works in reverse—the well-off spend more on it. But in total, basic goods consume a larger share for the poorest: in developed countries roughly two-thirds of the budget versus just over half for the wealthiest.

2
Share of food (1), housing, water and energy (2), transportation (3), and all basic goods (4) in expenditures of the poorest (blue) and richest (red) 20% of households in advanced economies (AEs), emerging markets (EMs), and low-income developing countries (LIDCs), %. Range across countries, line inside — median. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2026.

The median doesn't hide the extremes here. Taking the middle of the sample and dropping the top and bottom quarters of countries, the poorest families in developing economies spend roughly 41% to 56% of their budget on food, while the wealthiest spend 20% to 30%. In low-income countries this range for the poor shifts to 56–68%, and in nine out of ten countries food accounts for more than half their basket. In developed countries, housing and energy produce a similar gap: from one-third to 46% of spending for the poorest versus 18–27% for the wealthiest.

Hence the divergence in inflation. After an oil shock, the gap in cumulative inflation between the bottom and top quintiles reaches roughly 3 percentage points by the seventh quarter. A welfare model calibrated to the 2021–2023 crisis in 18 European countries shows that fiscal support then covered a notably larger share of losses for the poorest quintile than for the wealthiest.

Producer subsidies partially leak abroad

The most common and expensive government response to price spikes is producer subsidies. In the IMF model, governments typically have one goal: to cut the increase in household energy prices in half. If this is achieved through subsidies on feedstock for refining and power generation, in developed countries it costs roughly 16 times more in increased public debt than targeted transfers to the poor. In developing economies the difference is 14-fold, in low-income countries 22-fold.

Part of the money leaves the country in the process. Subsidies reduce costs throughout the supply chain, and cheaper petroleum products and electricity flow to exports. In developed economies, exports from these sectors jump 3–5 percentage points after a shock compared to the no-intervention scenario, whereas with consumer subsidies they barely change.

3
Deviation of petroleum product exports (sector 5, blue) and utilities (sector 9, red) from the no-government-support scenario with subsidies to producers (solid line) and consumers (dashed line) by quarters after energy shock, developed countries, percentage points. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2026, online appendix 2.5

The solid lines, representing producer subsidies, spike immediately after the shock and fade slowly: exports of petroleum products and utilities remain above the no-support scenario throughout the entire four-year horizon.

The dashed line (consumer subsidies) lies almost at zero: if you cut taxes for buyers, exports don't get cheaper. The distance between the solid and dashed lines shows the portion of support that goes to foreigners.

Consumer subsidies—that is, VAT and excise tax cuts—are cheaper but still lose out to targeted assistance. During a food shock in developed countries, they cost nearly 7 times more than targeted transfers while providing comparable support to consumption by the poorest. If subsidies are introduced by all countries simultaneously, they dampen the demand reduction that would cool the global market: peak energy prices end up roughly 3 percentage points higher.

Subsidies do have an upside: they bring down inflation faster and prevent it from feeding into expectations. But the longer the shock lasts, the more expensive it becomes to hold prices down. In a prolonged shock with a half-life of around 13 quarters, the advantage of targeted transfers for the poorest only grows for the same budget.

Russia's damper is precisely that producer subsidy

Russia is a special case in this picture. It's an energy exporter, and the global oil price spike is more revenue than expense for its budget. But the main instrument for restraining domestic prices, the fuel damper, is in its logic exactly the producer subsidy that the IMF considers the most expensive.

The government pays oil companies a damper subsidy when fuel exports are more profitable than domestic supplies. From January through August 2026, companies received 915.8 billion rubles under this program, including the January payment for December. This already exceeds the total for 2025, when payments amounted to 881.8 billion rubles. The increase began in spring, when oil prices rose due to the Middle East conflict and the discount on Urals narrowed.

The damper doesn't create the kind of export leakage the IMF describes—on the contrary, it compensates for lost export revenue to keep fuel in the country. But the second weakness manifests fully: the support doesn't distinguish between recipients. Cheap fuel goes to everyone, and according to IMF data, wealthy families spend roughly three times the share of their budget on transportation compared to poor families.

The authorities have no plans to change the mechanism. In August, Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Sazanov stated that adjusting the damper is not under discussion, since prices in the domestic market are stable.