This text is an automatic translation from Русский. It was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
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This text is an automatic translation from Русский. It was generated by AI and may contain inaccuracies.
Read original →How China fights corruption: statistics from the 2025 anti-corruption campaign, punishments for 983,000 officials, the Corruption Perceptions Index, and systemic limitations of the Chinese model.
China has been conducting a large-scale anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping's leadership since 2012, during which more than 6.2 million people have been punished. Despite unprecedented efforts, the country maintains a medium level of corruption (43 points out of 100 on the CPI index), which is related to structural features of the governance system. The campaign serves not only an anti-corruption function but also a political one, strengthening power and discipline within the party elite.
Corruption in China has accompanied the country's economic modernization for several decades. Rapid economic growth, massive state investments, and the outsized role of the party-state apparatus have created a fertile environment for abuse of power.
According to Transparency International, China scored 43 out of 100 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2025. The index measures how experts and the business community assess the prevalence of corruption—how commonplace or acceptable corrupt practices are considered to be in the public sector. The higher the score, the lower the perceived level of corruption. This result matches the global average and has remained essentially unchanged from 2024 (43 points) and 2023 (42 points).
Despite large-scale anti-corruption campaigns, China remains a country with a moderate level of perceived corruption. In the global rankings, the country sits roughly in the middle of the pack.
The reasons corruption persists lie in the structure of China's governance system:
For a long time, corruption was viewed as a byproduct of rapid economic growth. However, by the early 2010s, it had become a serious political risk for the Chinese Communist Party.
Over previous decades of rapid growth, the powers of regional authorities expanded significantly, the volume of state investments and infrastructure projects grew, increasing opportunities for abuse. Against this backdrop, high-profile corruption scandals at senior levels became more frequent. One of the most sensational was the 2012 case of Bo Xilai, the party chief of Chongqing, who was accused of corruption and abuse of power. The scandal was widely discussed throughout the country and demonstrated that corruption affected not only the regional level but the party elite itself. For China's leadership, this was a signal that the problem could undermine public trust in authority and discipline within the party, which in the long term threatened the legitimacy of the political system.
That same year marked a turning point for another reason: Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the CPC and the country's de facto leader. A massive anti-corruption campaign was launched, which quickly became a central element of China's domestic policy. Its official goal was framed as fighting both "tigers and flies"—meaning high-ranking officials and rank-and-file civil servants simultaneously.
The anti-corruption drive enjoyed broad public support and allowed the authorities to demonstrate their willingness to punish officials for abuses, strengthening the party's public legitimacy. At the same time, the campaign became a tool for tightening discipline within the elite and consolidating power: investigations targeted not only regional officials but also top leadership, including ministers, heads of state corporations, and generals of the People's Liberation Army of China.
The anti-corruption purges also strengthened control over key state institutions, primarily the military, where several high-ranking commanders have been removed from their posts in recent years. Ultimately, the campaign served not only an anti-corruption function but also a political one, reinforcing Xi Jinping's position within the party and military elite.
Since then, the anti-corruption policy has become one of the most extensive in global practice. According to Chinese supervisory authorities, more than 6.2 million people have been subjected to disciplinary punishment since 2012. In 2023–2024, several high-ranking generals and commanders of the rocket forces were removed from their posts, which analysts attribute not only to the fight against corruption but also to Xi Jinping's strengthening of personal control over the military.
Looking at current data, the scale of the campaign remains enormous. In 2025:
This is one of the highest figures in recent years. To understand the trend: in 2024 there were about 596,000 cases, with approximately 462,000 people punished, while 2025 saw nearly 1 million punished.
The increase in the number of punishments points to two things: the state is expanding the scale of investigations, and corruption remains a systemic problem.
The main instrument in this fight has been the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)—a party body wielding broad powers.
Its key functions include:
The system is built on several principles.
The anti-corruption campaign has a noticeable impact on China's economy, particularly in sectors where the state allocates resources. One such segment is the land market, which serves as a key revenue source for local authorities and has traditionally been considered among the most corrupt. Research shows that following anti-corruption investigations, regions have reduced their use of opaque land sale schemes, with prices more frequently approaching market rates. This has curtailed opportunities for informal arrangements between officials and developers, making business conditions more transparent.
However, the campaign also has side effects. Heightened oversight makes officials more cautious—many avoid taking initiative, fearing investigations. Analysts note this can slow economic decision-making at the local level and delay project implementation.
Additionally, restrictions on official spending—on banquets and entertainment events, for example—affect domestic demand. Economists have noted that such measures can reduce consumption growth by roughly 1 percentage point, given that China's public sector employs tens of millions of workers.
Despite the campaign's scale, its effectiveness remains a subject of debate. One of the main limitations of the Chinese model is that anti-corruption bodies are embedded within the party system and report to the Communist Party. Oversight is conducted from within the same structure where corrupt practices originate.
Another persistent problem is limited transparency. Independent investigations and public oversight remain underdeveloped in China, and access to information about many cases stays restricted. This reduces the ability to externally assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy.
Moreover, systemic incentives for corruption persist. China's economy depends heavily on administrative allocation of resources—land, credit, licenses, and government contracts. When access to such resources is determined by officials' decisions, room for abuse remains. This is precisely why corruption perception indicators in international rankings change relatively slowly, despite large-scale investigations.