Capacity on Paper, But Not in Practice

The Surplus Zeros

In 2010, according to the report on the functioning of Russia's Unified Energy System, the installed capacity of power plants stood at 214,869 MW. Even on the peak consumption day (January 26, 2010), the load didn't exceed 151,271 MW. The reserve margin was around 30%—electricity was in surplus.

However, this surplus was primarily explained by weak demand and the legacy of Soviet-era energy infrastructure. Between 1991 and 2010, only 32.153 GW of new capacity was commissioned—just 15% of the total fleet. The rest consisted of Soviet-built plants. And in the following decade, Russia's energy sector would face the challenges of aging infrastructure.

The Transitional 2010s

Authorities understood that Soviet equipment wasn't eternal. 2010 became the inflection point when this "legacy" transformed from a competitive advantage (cheap, fully depreciated capacity) into systemic risk. That's why the Capacity Supply Agreements (DPM) program was launched for a ten-year term. Its goal: to stimulate investment in equipment modernization.

The result: between 2010 and 2020, the installed capacity of Russia's Unified Energy System increased by 16.29%, while consumption grew more modestly—by 7.12%. Formally, a step forward. In reality—a partial upgrade, but with a new time bomb planted: a significant portion of the new equipment was imported. After the 2014 sanctions, and especially those of 2022, replacing or repairing such equipment became a matter of logistics and geopolitics. Meanwhile, the "Soviet legacy" kept spinning—both literally and figuratively.

Now About the Present

Russia entered the third decade of the 21st century with a critical problem: power plant deterioration. According to Rosstat, the depreciation rate of fixed assets in 2023 exceeded 51.5%. In other words, over the next decade, half of the generating equipment will need to be replaced or undergo major overhaul.

At the end of 2023, installed capacity stood at 263,717 MW. Peak load (January 15, 2024) reached 168,273 MW. Formally, a surplus of over 33%. But the share of aging units remains enormous—and with each passing year, they're becoming not just vulnerable, but accident-prone. There is a way out of this situation—but it won't come cheap.

Grid Bottlenecks

Russia's power grid is formally unified, but in practice it's a patchwork quilt with burned-through sections. The first problem is climatic. The 2024 anomalies in the South led to outages: heat waves, surging consumption, plus local equipment failures. A perfect storm.

The second is logistical. While the fleet in the European part and the South operates at 80–85% capacity, in the Far East it's around 70%, with the rest held in reserve. But you can't simply redirect power from the Amur to the Kuban at the push of a button: grid constraints, worn-out transmission lines, and limited flexibility stand in the way.

The third is technological. The Ministry of Energy cheerfully reports a reduction in import dependence—from 67% to 38%. But dig a little deeper: that "Russian" 220 kV circuit breaker has Chinese porcelain, an Indian drive mechanism, and Chinese electronics. A global puzzle, assembled in the Moscow region.

What to Expect Going Forward

The Ministry of Energy and SO UES forecast consumption growth from 1,196 to 1,298 billion kWh by 2030. That's +2.1% annually—driven by megaprojects: LNG complexes in the East, BAM expansion, industrial zones. But regional energy appetite is already growing now.

The question is—what to do with the "Soviet legacy"? Half of all thermal units are over 40 years old. By 2035, roughly 90 GW of equipment will need to be either decommissioned or refurbished. Without new capacity coming online, the power reserve could drop below 10% as early as 2029.

There is a plan. On paper it looks robust: DPM-2—modernization of 41 GW through 2031, plus 16 new power units from Rosatom by 2035 (another 29 GW). But executing this plan is an entirely different story. Sanctions, expensive money, component shortages. What's needed here isn't just a plan—it's willpower.